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6.1  Introduction 
The usual analysis of  redistribution deals with taxes and the regular 
money transfer payments made by government and perhaps some institu- 
tions. And the usual analysis of  income and income distribution makes 
use of concepts like total family money income measured before taxes but 
after some transfers. The purpose of  this paper  is  not  to provide  a 
comprehensive discussion of an ideal set of national accounts but to touch 
on a few aspects where we have some data to enliven the theoretical 
discussion. In the process we need to be conscious of  three kinds of 
models: an institutional model that determines many of the insurance and 
governmental transfers, a behavioral model that deals with individual 
decisions about giving and getting help in time or money, and an account- 
ing model that focuses on each individual’s net contribution to or benefit 
from the various transfer mechanisms including voluntary and altruistic 
(nonreciprocal) ones. 
We can think of  individuals, in families, where institutional arrange- 
ments alter earned incomes into disposable incomes after the regular 
(involuntary) transfers and taxes. Rules and regulations and insurance 
principles determine all these, and we  pick up the situation after they 
have done their work.  Three types of  voluntary transfers take place 
within the private sector: (a) transfers between individuals and philan- 
thropic institutions; (b) transfers between individuals not living together, 
between friends or relatives, including alimony and child support; and (c) 
intrafamily transfers implicit when people live together and some pro- 
duce or earn more than others. 
James N. Morgan is professor of economics and a program  director of the  Survey 
Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
199 200  James N.  Morgan 
6.2  Institutional Voluntary Transfers 
A major form of  transfer currently attracting attention is private phi- 
lanthropy, donated in both money and time. We need a behavioral model 
to deal with these, but we know very little about the sources and motiva- 
tions for altruism except that we know altruistic attitudes go along with 
altruism, but that does not explain much (Thiessen 1968); Macaulay and 
Berkowitz  1970; Smith 1973; Sills 1957). Also giving time and giving 
money tend to  be complementary rather than competitive (Morgan, Dye, 
and Hybels 1977). Tax provisions make them equal for upper-income 
people, but giving money is more costly than giving time for those who do 
not itemize tax deductions. Our study of giving in 1973  is the only one that 
covered both time and money. Indeed, no full-scale national surveys of 
details of  philanthropy  had been  conducted prior to that  study. The 
Consumer Expenditure Survey of  the Bureau of  Labor Statistics gener- 
ally includes “contributions” as a category (Lamale and Clorety 1959; 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1965). Two rather specialized studies of 
large givers focused on reactions to tax laws (Commission 1970; Hunter 
1968). In the course  of  studying well-being and its intergenerational 
aspects, the Survey Research Center in 1960 asked about gifts to friends 
and relatives, to churches or religious organizations, and to other organ- 
izations “like Community Chest, schools, cancer or heart associations, 
and so forth.” A 1965 Survey Research Center Study, Productive Amer- 
icans, asked about time spent doing “volunteer work without pay such as 
work for church or charity, or helping relatives” (Morgan, Sirageldin and 
Baerwaldt 1966). The older and more affluent and better educated were 
giving more money, and the better educated were giving more time. 
In the spring of  1973 the Office of  Tax Analysis of  the United States 
Treasury asked us to do a small study of the giving of those who itemized 
and those who did not itemize their deductions (Roistacher and Morgan 
1974). With the relatively small sample and no overrepresentation of the 
upper-income groups, the Treasury study could not distinguish among 
those with widely differing marginal tax rates; but it could look at those 
who were itemizing their deductions compared to those who were not. 
Income, home ownership, and family size largely determined whether it 
paid to itemize, and income and itemization status largely determined 
whether the household gave and how much it gave. Indeed, itemization 
seemed primarily to affect whether the household gave at all. Only at 
incomes above $10,000 did it affect the amounts givers gave to religious 
organizations, and  only  at  incomes above  $25,000 did  it  affect the 
amounts givers gave to nonreligious charities. But as Martin Feldstein 
pointed out to us, the combination of differences in “whether” and “how 
much” leads to estimates of substantial “price elasticities” of giving. The 
Treasury study also showed substantial differences in the age pattern of 201  Time in  the Measurement of  Transfers and Well-Being 
giving between those giving to religious organizations and those giving to 
other donees. 
Finally, to provide an extensive pretest and some early indications of 
responses to changed standard deductions, the Filer Commission funded 
a small national survey in October 1973, repeating the questions of the 
Treasury study and adding some questions to cover gifts of  time and 
money, itemization and changes in itemization, and the perceived effects 
of  the latter (Roistacher, Morgan, and Juster 1974). 
When asked general reasons for recent past changes in giving, almost 
no one mentioned  tax  considerations.  Among the families who  had 
stopped itemizing, only 7.5  percent said that the change had affected the 
amount they contributed to charity. On the other hand, just as in the 
larger study reported here, many (43 percent) felt that people in general 
would give less without the tax incentive of deductibility, and a substan- 
tial minority (26 percent) felt that people like them (in the same financial 
situation) would give less. At incomes of $25,000 and more, nearly half of 
the respondents felt that families in financial situations like theirs would 
give less without deductibility. 
The October 1973 data on actual giving also showed substantial effects 
of  tax deductibility (itemization). Once again the effect was greatest on 
whether the family gave at all; but among the givers, itemizers also gave 
more.  Adjustments  for spurious correlation through  age and income 
differences between itemizers and nonitemizers (and nonfilers) reduced 
the apparent effects but did not erase them. Additional adjustments for 
differences in education, family size, occupation, race, homeownership, 
and marital status reduced the differences to the borderline of  signifi- 
cance, but such adjustments involve overcorrection.  In any case, the 
remaining differences still indicated that itemization was associated with 
greater giving. 
These data  also indicated  what  we  found  in the  1974 study-that 
itemizers also give more time. This would indicate that time and money 
go together since gifts of time are “tax-exempt” regardless of itemization 
status. That is, if  one had spent the time to earn money and given the 
money, the result would have been the same as giving time, provided the 
money gift could have been itemized. Actually, itemizing was mostly 
associated with whether time was given at all rather than with the amount 
given. 
None of  those other studies asked much detail about giving, about 
information about tax laws, or about the giving of both money and time 
(in the same interview). Also, none of them provided an adequate sample 
of  upper-income  families. Indeed, the  1960 Survey Research Center 
study oversampled the lower end of the income distribution because of its 
interest in poverty. In an earlier study made before recent legal changes, 
we found that even the affluent lacked information about marginal tax 202  James N.  Morgan 
rates  and made  only infrequent gifts of  appreciated assets (Barlow, 
Brazer, and Morgan 1966). 
A lot of  research has been done on altruism using experiments or 
studies of organized groups and there is a good deal of historical discus- 
sion of  the development of  philanthropy in the United States (Lenrow 
1965;  Macaulay and Berkowitz 1970). One of the founders of the Society 
for the Study of  the Grants Economy, Kenneth Boulding, has recently 
attempted to develop a theoretical structure within economics to handle 
philanthropy and other transfers, as well as coercive redistributions by 
war, taxes, robbery, and extortion (Boulding 1973). However, no neat 
equilibrium or set of maximization rules can handle factors such as gifts, 
taxes, theft, and war. Nor did this study attempt one. Our purpose was to 
find out who gives what to whom and to add several kinds of evidence as 
to why they give. 
Studies have been made of voluntarism, but the only national sample 
surveys of volunteer time in addition to Productive Americans were two 
that were done by the United States Census Bureau, the first in 1965 for 
the Department of  Labor and the second in 1974 for ACTION (U.S. 
Department of  Labor 1969; ACTION 1975; Wolozin 1975) and there 
have been  some recent economic discussions of  voluntarism (Becker 
1976; Weisbrod 1977; Alchian 1973; Phelps 1975). 
Even though sample surveys are more useful for providing data helpful 
in understanding who gives what to whom and why than for estimating 
amounts, it is interesting to note that the aggregates derived from the 
survey covering 1973 totaled $26 billion in philanthropic contributions 
and nearly  six billion hours  of  volunteer  time. Valued  at estimated 
opportunity cost for individuals (by gender and education and age), that 
volunteer time came to $19 billion for husbands and single household 
heads, and another $10 billion for wives, totaling more than the money 
given.' In addition, wives who did volunteer work reported an additional 
$760 million in out-of-pocket costs. Aggregates of  skewed distributions 
from sample surveys are of  course crude (and made more so by possible 
response variance) but it seems clear that private philanthropy is substan- 
tial, even relative to public transfers, and that at any reasonable valua- 
tion, the time given is as important as the money given. 
6.3  Private Interfamily Transfers 
Time spent helping friends, neighbors, and relatives on an individual 
basis was also reported in this study, and a crude estimate of  about 83 
hours per family for 69 million families comes to more than 7 billion 
hours. At the same average value per hour calculated above for volunteer 
time, this time would be valued at $42 billion, though this may be an 203  Time in the Measurement of  Transfers and Well-Being 
exaggeration  since much  of  the help was  manual  labor. These time 
transfers were reported at all income levels, however. 
In our economic surveys we frequently ask about money transfers to 
individuals to estimate the number of  outside dependents affecting in- 
come taxes. About 11 percent of  families report such out-transfers, but 
only 4 percent provide more than half  of  anyone’s support, and fewer 
than 2 percent provide more than half  the support for more than one 
person. If  we take the 1980 13th wave of  the Panel Study of  Income 
Dynamics reporting on 1979 and the 1974 study of philanthropy in 1973, 
we can derive the crude estimates, using 1979 prices and 1979 population, 
in table 6.1. Table 6.1 also uses a 1965 estimate of  time spent helping 
individuals or in volunteer work for organizations and a 1960 estimate of 
contributions  to  derive  1979 aggregates,  allowing  for  expansion  in 
population and price levels (Morgan, Sirageldin, and Baerwaldt 1966; 
Morgan et al. 1962). 
Of course, other aggregate sources of information on the main institu- 
tional and government transfers are available. Our purpose is neither to 
estimate aggregates nor to compare survey data with other sources, but 
rather  to put  the dollar amounts in perspective  with  the nonmoney 
transfers of  time or services. The survey data are likely to underreport 
government transfers  received  more  than  they  underreport  time  or 
money given, and the valuation of  the time given is difficult. But the 
numbers in table 6.1 indicate substantial private transfers ignored in the 
national accounts. The parenthetical dollar estimates were opportunity 
cost estimates in 1973 and an arbitrary $6 an hour in 1979. 
Returning to our behavioral model, individuals can also make transfers 
to relatives by doubling up and providing housing and other goods and 
services directly and probably more efficiently, but at some emotional 
cost. Clearly people prefer to live in “nuclear families,” and, in particu- 
lar, one person in the kitchen is seen as optimal (Morgan et al. 1962, 
chap. 14). The nation has seen a long period of undoubling of households 
since the end of World War 11, facilitated, many believe, by the increas- 
ing adequacy of  the incomes of older people as Social Security benefits 
improved. At present, fewer than 10 percent of families provide housing 
for others who are not their young children, and it is most commonly 
large nuclear families of seven or more who also house other relatives. 
Between 1970 and 1980 the percentage of  those aged 65-74  living as 
guests in others’ households has decreased from 10.4 to 6.9 percent; for 
those aged 75 or older, the decrease was from 19.5 to 13.9  percent. On the 
other hand, money contributions to others come largely from families 
where the taxable income of the head and wife is greater than $25,000, 
implying that affluent families send money to needy relatives, while less 
affluent, larger, families invite them to share their home. In our early 204  James N. Morgan 
Table 6.1  Annual Giving of Time and Money-Some Crude Aggregates 
Aggregates  Aggregates 
Per Family  (billions)  (billions)” 
1973  1973  1979 
Hours  Dollars  Hours  Dollars  Hours  Dollars 
1974 Study of Philanthropy in 1973 
Money philanthropy  -  $459  -  $25.7  -  $63.0 
Time to organizations 
-  Husband or single head  47  -  3.2  (19)  - 
Per household  85  -  5.9  (20)  - 
Wife (48 million wives)  55  -  2.7  (10)  7.2  (43.2) 
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1960 Income and Welfare in the U.S. 
Contributions to individuals and 
institutions, including alimony, 
gifts in kind  $315  66.4 
“84.7 million families in 1979. Inflation 1959-79  =  x 2.48; 1973-79  =  x 1.62. 
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study of income distribution, Income and Welfare in the United States, we 
actually divided families into “adult units” consisting only of those mar- 
ried to each other plus their children (Morgan et al. 1962). For purposes 
of examining inequality or studying factors affecting  doubling up this may 
still be necessary, but for purposes of estimating transfers, as we shall see, 
we can deal with families as they live together and estimate the intrafami- 
ly transfers. 
Some people, about 5 percent of  households, live rent-free. Much of 
the free rent is probably a transfer, but some may reflect a nonmoney 
income, as when the building engineer lives free in the building. 
6.4  Emergency Help-Time  and Money 
Regular interfamily transfers are not common, nor large, but a natural 
question  arises:  Is  the  insurance  value  of  commitments to provide 
emergency help in the form of  time or money important? While we 
cannot answer that question in aggregate dollar or hour terms, we do 
have information from the 1980 13th wave of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, based on a series of questions about emergency help, actual 
and potential, in time and money, given and received, to or from friends 
or relatives, nearby or far away.2 
Since emergencies may not come every year, respondents were asked 
about actual help in the last five years. Given the known tendency for 
people to include some previous year’s activity in reports on a single 
previous year, we should also avoid exaggeration this way, but we also 
might have some understatement from memory losses, particularly of 
help received. In fact, whether it is better or not, it is easier to remember 
giving than receiving: 15 percent reported getting help in the form of 
time, but 28 percent reporting giving it. Twenty-two percent reported 
getting emergency help in the form of money, but 29 percent reported 
giving it. 
The real bias could be smaller than these figures indicate, of  course, 
since a single family could get help from more than one other family. 
Since more help goes from parents to children than the reverse, and most 
parents have more than one child, multiple giving could actually be more 
common than multiple receiving, resulting in more receivers than givers. 
On the other hand, couples have two sets of  parents from whom to 
receive help. 
At  any  rate,  a  substantial  minority  reported  giving  or receiving 
emergency help, and some of  the financial help was seen as a gift rather 
than as a loan. Perceived availability of  help was even more common: 
two-thirds said they could get “several hundred dollars” or more, mostly 
from parents or siblings, mostly as a loan. Eight in ten said they could call 
on friends or relatives nearby to “spend a lot of  time helping out7’  in a 
serious emergency, in two-thirds of the cases with no obligation to repay 206  James N. Morgan 
in some way. If  those persons  were not  available for help, the vast 
majority said there would be someone else. More than 70 percent said 
that they  could get emergency help from someone who did not live 
nearby.  We  have  not  attempted  to  estimate  probabilities,  average 
amounts, or economic values (net of  expected repayments), but there 
clearly is real sharing in society today. The growth of  public transfer 
systems has not supplanted all of  the old private altruism or extended 
family responsibilities. 
The age patterns are interesting and important to note, since we shall 
find strong age patterns in intrafamily transfers too. The young benefit 
largely from interfamily emergency help in time and money, and the 
older-middle-aged but not retired largely provide it (see table 6.2). 
6.5  Intrafamily Transfers 
We turn now to our third concern, the area where the role of time and 
other nonmoney transfers becomes most important: transfers inside the 
family living together. At this point we leave the behavioral model of 
decisions about who lives with whom and who supports others outside the 
household, and move to a model where accounting is more important as 
we attempt to attribute the income and the consumption of the family to 
individual family members.  The difference between them  is  the net 
transfer of the individual to or from the family he or she lives with. 
We start with the components of  a more comprehensive estimate of 
total family income, then (a) allocate it to the individuals  who earned it or 
account  for  its presence,  and  (b) estimate for  each individual what 
fraction of  the total is of benefit to that person. The first step requires 
including nonmoney components of income, and the second step involves 
estimating the different needs of individuals of different age and gender. 
We do not have to deal with economies of  scale from living together 
because it is the average, not the marginal, benefit we e~timate.~ 
We have a considerable amount of detail on money income in the 1980 
Table 6.2  Percent Reporting Giving or Getting Emergency Time 
or Money Help in the Last Five Years, 
by Age (6533 family heads reporting in 1980) 
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Panel Study. We use the net equity in any owned home for estimating 
imputed rent, and the hours spent on housework  and child care for 
estimating time contributions other than those involved in earning money 
for the family. In 1979 we asked about other unpaid productive activi- 
ties-repairing  the house or car; growing and preserving food-but  did 
not attempt to divide the hours spent between family members. For those 
interested in the informal economy, unaccounted for in National Income, 
people’s reports of  amounts saved by  such work per household in 1978 
were $118 for work on the car, $327 for work on the house, and $62 for 
growing or preserving food. It was mostly the young who worked on cars, 
the middle-aged on houses, and the older people who grew food (Morgan 
1981). 
The total real income of the family that must be allocated to individuals 
can be accounted for and classified as follows: 
1. Labor income 
2.  Other taxable income 
Asset income-rent,  interest, dividends, etc. 
Alimony 
Child support received 
Imputed rent (5  percent of  net equity, to approximate) 





5. Noncontributory transfers 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
Supplemental Security Income 
Other welfare 
Value of  food stamp subsidy 
Value of  heating subsidy 
3.  Other earned income (nontaxable) 
6.  Value of time spend on housework and child care 
The sequence of questions that elicit this information asks more detail 
about husband and wife than about other family members. The aggregate 
income components of  “others” (other than head and wife) are coded 
with assignments of missing information at the family level, but coded for 
each individual only as taxable or transfer income, with an indication of 
whether the taxable income was labor, asset income, or both, and the 
main source of  transfers. Appendix B gives the procedures we used for 
allocating income to individual family members. The most important 
policy we adopted was to pool and split the asset, contributory transfer, 
and imputed rental income evenly between husband  and wife on the 
grounds that they contributed equally to it or at least that we do not know 208  James N. Morgan 
the actual contributions of each. Their noncontributory transfer incomes 
were attributed to family members in the same way that consumption was 
allocated, neutralizing any “redistribution” of  such income. 
A variety of estimates of the value of imputed rent are possible. If one 
believed Irving Fisher, one might argue for 2 or 3 percent as the real 
return on the net equity, the rest being capital gains eroded by inflation. 
At the other extreme one might argue for 13 percent, the 10 percent 
annual increase in the house prices in this period plus a 3 percent net 
rental income, earned and consumed by the owner. Of course, the real 
cost and hence net rental income of  a house depends on the family’s tax 
bracket and how  much mortgage interest it  can deduct (Duncan and 
Morgan 1980). We settled for 5 percent of the net equity, a compromise. 
The major problem in estimating intrafamily transfers, however, is 
how to value the time people contribute. Even the time spent working for 
money, it might be argued, should be valued somewhat differently from 
wages, to allow for income taxes and a certain disparity between wages 
and real contribution arising from “dual labor markets” or other market 
imperfections (e.g., immobile workers). Housework time is even more 
difficult, since using “opportunity cost” estimated as hourly earnings of 
people of similar age, gender, and education involves two possible selec- 
tion biases arising from people’s decisions about working for money and 
about having children and doing a lot of housework. So before using even 
a compromise estimate, we look separately at intrafamily transfers of 
money and of housework time. 
This procedure involves some difficult decisions. We can assume that 
the family money income is consumed roughly in proportion to the food 
needs of individuals by age and gender (see appendix B for details), but 
what about time? We have bravely assumed that the benefits of  house- 
work time are proportional in the same way, which probably underesti- 
mates the benefits to children, who need more attention. A not-quite- 
appropriate bit of evidence is the impact of changing family composition 
on housework hours, which estimates the marginal cost of  family mem- 
bers. Table 6.3 shows one set of estimates based on changes from 1975 to 
1979, although they are not adjusted for economies of scale, and another 
set based on 1979 static (long-term?) interfamily differences. 
At any rate, if  we credit each individual with the housework hours 
provided and deduct an estimated “consumption” of  a fraction of  the 
total housework benefits, we have the net time contributions by age and 
gender of  figure 6.1. It is no surprise, of  course, that women are the 
contributors of  such time, and men the beneficiaries. By comparison, if 
we take the money income (including imputed rent, asset income, and 
money transfers) and for each individual deduct from hidher contribu- 
tion hidher estimated consumption of the money’s benefits, we have the 
patterns of  figure 6.2.  Only in  the 3544  age group, when there are 209  Time in the Measurement of  Transfers and Well-Being 
Table 6.3  Effects of Family Members on Level and Change in Time Costs 
(Housework) and Food Costs-Regression  Coefficients (for 4730 
families with the same head or wife 1975-80) 
Regression Coefficients 
1975-79  Change in”  1979 Level ofb 
Food  Food 
Our  House-  Con-  House-  Con- 
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“Regressing change on change in numbers of  family members of  each type, controlling also 
for income component changes. 
bRegressing level on number of family members of each type, controlling also for overall 
incomeheeds. 
*Significant at p < .05. 
**Significant at p < .01. 
children to benefit too, do women contribute more dollars than their 
estimated consumption of  dollar benefits. We assume, of  course, that 
even dollars saved or used to pay taxes benefit individuals in the family in 
roughly the same proportions as the dollars spent for living costs. 
Another way to compare men and women is to compare their total 
hours spent in earning money, commuting, or doing housework. Figure 
6.3  shows that over most of the life course, things are pretty even in those 
dimensions. Only when the men retire and the women still do most of the 
housework does a discrepancy appear. It should be said that we truncated 
the reports on housework hours at 6000 hours per person per year, which 
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Fig. 6.2  1979 net contribution  of  $ income to family for males and 
females, by age, for 18,920 sample and nonsample individuals 
in  1980 
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Av 
Net contribution of hours to family for males and females, by 
age, for 18,920 sample and nonsample individuals in 1980 
(money work, commuting, housework, consumption of  time 
allocated like consumption of family income) 
In estimating the aggregate amount of intrafamily transfers, we cannot 
of course keep time and money separate. To do so would exaggerate the 
total amount of transfers-failing  to balance money transfers from hus- 
band to wife by time transfers the other way. Hence we are driven to 
estimate the dollar value of housework, however arbitrarily. We settled 
on $6 an hour, with no distinction between men and women or between 
education levels, although it is entirely possible to experiment with a 
variety of assigned values. Figure 6.4 shows  the age-gender patterns when 
we value housework at $6 an hour. We have selected a level at which 
some net transfer from men to women occurs during the men’s peak 
earning years, and from women to men later on. The average hourly 
earnings of working wives in 1979 was $5.40, that of all household heads 
was $8.09, and that of  female heads somewhere between. Table 6.4 
reports some aggregate estimates from 1970, for 1976 and for 1979 from 
the Panel Study of  Income Dynamics, which are similar to those pre- 
sented in this study, except that two values of housework time are used in 
1976, $5/hour and an opportunity cost wage corrected for selection bias, 
and in 1970 opportunity cost and a market cost estimate for housework 
were used (Baerwaldt and Morgan 1973; Morgan 1978). 
Table 6.A.1 in  appendix B gives the housework data separately at 
$6/hour, allowing different values for different age and sex groups to be 212  James N. Morgan 
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Fig. 6.4  1979 average net contribution to the family living together, by 
age and sex 
(counting housework and child care at $61 hour) 
used and the implications spelled out at least for subgroup average net 
contributions. Given the limitations on available extra work, and on 
available paid day care, opportunity cost estimates have problems too. 
On the other hand, it is credible that people do housework and child care 
believing it is better than what they might pay for. 
6.6  Estimating Aggregate Intrafamily Transfers 
In the NIPA the flows of money that go to people who did not currently 
earn it are also called transfer incomes. National income accounting for 
family transfers should count only the aggregate of  the net subsidies 
received, or the aggregate of  the net contributions made, but not both 
since that would count a dollar transfer twice-once when contributed, 
once when received.  On the other hand, averaging to obtain the net 
contributions of  a group can eliminate offsetting amounts completely. 
Indeed, except for errors and rounding, the overall average net contribu- 
tion for the whole population should be zero. If we ignore the sign, add up 
the contributions and subsidies, and divide by two, we have the amount 
of transfer flow for either a group or for the whole sample. Table 6.A.1  in 
appendix B gives such average estimates for the subgroups by  age and 213  Time in the Measurement of  Transfers and Well-Being 
Table 6.4  Intrafamily TransfersSome Rough Aggregates (assuming 225 
million individuals in 1979) 
1979 Estimates 
(using 18,930 
individuals)  Aggregates 
~  (billions) 
Average 




child care time transfer  440  49.50  297 
Absolute total time (hours)  757  85.16  511 
Combined average absolute 
Absolute average $ transfer  $5396  - 
net transfer allowing 
housework--child  care at $6/hr.  6180  -  695 
A Comparison of Estimatesa 
1970  1976 
Housework 
Valued At: 
Oppor-  Oppor-  1979 
Market  tunity  tunity  - 
Costb  CostC  Costd  $5  $6 
Intrafamily  transfers  313  398  528  552  695 
Gross national product  982  982  1516  1516  2400 
Ratio TR/GNP  327  41  35  36  29 
"In current dollars and populations. See Baerwaldt and Morgan (1973) and Morgan (1978) 
for earlier data. 
b$1.50-2.50  depending on region and city size. 
'$1.674.32  depending on marital status, education, and city size. 
dComplex estimate allowing for selection bias (see Morgan 1978). 
sex, but a more important estimate is the aggregate amount of intrafamily 
transfer in comparison with the transfers in the national accounts. 
Estimating aggregates from a sample is best done by estimating an 
average per person and then multiplying by  an outside, more precise, 
estimate of the aggregate number of persons. Estimating averages in our 
sample necessitated using weights to take account of  different sampling 
and response rates, and all the data we have given are so weighted. Some 
of  the individuals were not sample members, yet we had to include them 
to balance out the families we studied for this purpose. They were given 
the same weights as the other family members. Actually, weights used in 
estimating a weighted average of 18,920  cases will make very little differ- 
ence. Other sources of variation plus conceptual and measurement prob- 
lems are probably more serious. In fact, omitting nonsample members 214  James N. Morgan 
and using individual weights resulted in  15,317 cases and an average 
absolute net transfer of  $6204 rather than the $6180 of  table 6.4. 
The results given in table 6.4, assuming 1979 prices and a 1979 popula- 
tion of 225 million, are an aggregate intrafamily transfer of $695 billion. If 
we look at dollars and time separately, we have $607 billion in dollar 
transfers, and nearly 50 billion hours of housework transfers, which at $6 
is nearly $300 billion. 
The implication remains as we stated it some years ago-we  have not 
“socialized” the responsibility for dependent members of  society as far as 
we might think; families remain responsible for most of the burden. The 
implications of  continued  sluffing off  of  responsibility for each other 
could be a huge increase in the government or institutional transfers to 
replace the private interfamily and intrafamily transfers. The marketizing 
or monetarizing of child care will quite likely continue, decreasing intra- 
family transfers.  In so  far as people already pay  for child care, the 
housework hours in our estimates have already been reduced. 
Whatever the measurement and conceptual problems, time and its 
productive  use in unpaid ways are clearly important in  assessing the 
amount of  transfers taking place. The valuation of  that time and the 
expectations about it underlie much of the discussion of  equity between 
men and women. 
6.7  Time in the Assessment of the Results of Transfers 
The other side of  the coin is that  the time-use that produces  real 
income, often for the  benefit of  others in  a family, also affects the 
well-being of people by reducing their leisure. And even if we despair of 
estimating the reallocation of  resources within the family, we need to 
know how much time is being devoted to paid and unpaid productive 
activities by family members if  we are to assess their level of well-being 
and discuss the distribution of  “income” in its most meaningful sense. 
Perhaps the simplest way to start is to think of  family well-being as 
resulting from two main components: its control over resources relative 
to its needs, and its time remaining to enjoy those resources after the 
work it takes to get them. If  there is some indifference curve relating 
leisure and things, or some revealed preference, then there must also be a 
ophelimite function (to use Pareto’s term). If  we assume this function is 
similar to a production function with labor and capital, then the question 
is: What are appropriate exponents to the two terms, incomeheeds and 
leisure/adult? 
Much discussion of the problem of  comparing single-earner and two- 
earner families implies this issue without coming to grips with it. And the 
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greater needs, but not on the greater unpaid but productive use of time in 
housework and childcare. 
An initial bit of empirical evidence of the importance of taking account 
of  differences in need and in leisure (or its other face, productive time 
use) is given in table 6.5. The positive correlation between income and 
needs implies that using income alone exaggerates the amount of inequal- 
ity (high-income families tend to be larger and need more income). The 
high correlation between income and total work hours (paid and unpaid) 
implies that income alone also exaggerates inequality by  ignoring the 
amount of effort provided by high-income families and the lower amount 
of  time they have left to enjoy their income. 
We also looked at the correlations of change to see whether changes in 
well-being were badly measured by changes in income because of corre- 
lated changes in needs or in leisure time.  Again the correlations are 
sufficiently large to indicate systematic bias. (Even if  the correlations 
were low, the measurement variance would remain a problem, perhaps 
made worse because no systematic correction would be possible.) 
One more bit of empirical evidence relates to the question of whether 
the pattern of correlations among the components of  well-being is uni- 
form in the population. If the correlations were linear and uniform across 
population subgroups, then the proper weighting of  components would 
not matter much. But as table 6.6 shows, the relationships vary among 
subgroups. Among middle-aged couples, accounting for leisure makes 
very little difference since everyone is working hard, and needs vary less 
and are only mildly correlated with income. The age extremes are where 
the disparities among the components of  well-being make the use of 
income alone such a bad measure of well-being and of inequality. This is 
particularly true for families with no wife present. 
Table 6.5  Some Static and Dynamic Correlations Relevant to Differences 
among Different Measures of Well-Being (for 5501 individuals who 
were head or wife in  1976 and in 1980, in families with the same 
head and wife 197580) 
Correlations of  1979 data: 
Total family income and family needs 
Total family income and total work hours" 




Correlations of  change 1975-79 
Change in income and change in needs 
Change in income and change in total work hours" 




"Work hours include paid work of  head, wife, and others; commuting of head and wife; and 
housework  by  head, wife, or others. Needs not  adjusted for inflation,  so no spurious 
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Table 6.6  Intercorrelations and Relative Variances of Components of 
Well-Being by  Life-Cycle Groups 
Correlations 
Relative Variability 
Needs  Leisure  Leisure  (standard deviationhean) 
with  with  with 
In-  In-  Income/  In-  Lei-  Income/ 
come  come  Needs  come  Needs  sure  Needs 
All  .22  -.24  -.18  .24  .34  .25  .74 
Single (no wife present)  .52  -43  -.35  .37  .46  .31  .94 
Under 30  .77  -.31  -.38  .44  .47  .26  .93 
30 or  older  .43  -.47  -.35  .34  .46  .33  .93 
30-59  .10  -.21  -.21  .28  .38  .33  .91 
60 or older  .82  -.74  -.57  .50  .66  .33  .98 
Married  .15  -.20  -.13  .23  .33  .23  .70 
Under 30  .12  -.23  -.25  .16  .18  .21  .52 
30 or older  .15  -.19  -.11  .23  .33  .23  .73 
30-59  .16  -.19  -.11  .21  .32  .22  .69 
60 or older  .13  -.20  -.12  .24  .41  .28  .99 
Is there any way to estimate what the exponents of the leisure and 
incomeheeds  components  of  a utility function should be? One traditional 
approach is to infer the shape of  an indirect utility function from a labor 
supply function. In fact, there would have to  be two related labor supply 
functions for husband and wife. So  far most such work has assumed a 
one-worker  family and ended up with a utility function based on the main 
earner’s  wage  rate and all other family income.  It is  difficult  to be 
enthusiastic about an estimate of family well-being that treats the wife’s 
earnings as exogenous. 
Until we can come up with some more convincing empirical, revealed- 
preference estimate of the family utility function, it might be useful to 
look  briefly  at the implications  of  reasonable  if  arbitrary  well-being 
functions that take account of  incomeheeds and leisure/adult. Actually 
these functions have to do  more than assign exponents, they also have to 
deal with economies of  scale in the family in the creation of  a family 
“needs” standard to take account of  family  composition. The needs 
standard we  have  been  using  is  the official,  federal basis  of  poverty 
estimates.  It starts  with an estimate  of food needs for each family member 
according to age and gender, applies an economy-of-scale correction for 
total family food costs, multiplies by three to expand to all costs, and 
applies another economy-of-scale correction.  Corrections are also ap- 
plied for farmers and for single, older people. 
The 1981  poverty standard was roughly $25OOplus $1250per person, so 
that a  family with  two children would  “need”  $7500 if  they  stayed 217  Time in the Measurement of Transfers and Well-Being 
together, but if  each parent took one child, forming two-person families, 
each would  “need” $5000, for a total of  $10,000. Hence any income 
maintenance scheme based on that definition of need would imply sub- 
stantial attempts to recapture economies of scale and substantial incen- 
tives to split. 
The importance  of  the “needs” formula lies in its common use  in 
setting income maintenance standards. Put simply, income maintenance 
programs attempt to recapture some of the economies of  scale of living 
together, at the cost of  providing incentives for families to split up. 
Similarly, ignoring work and leisure in a well-being or poverty needs 
measure also has implications for incentives, both to double or undouble 
and to work. Particularly if  “credit” is given for child care in assessing 
well-being, taxes and income maintenance payments based on such an 
expanded measure are  more likely to approximate neutrality with respect 
to individual decisions about work and living together. 
One way to see the relevance of  an expanded definition of  well-being is 
to define  a  reasonable  one, assume  an income  maintenance and tax 
program based on it rather than dollar income, and assess the impact of 
individual decisions about working and about changing family composi- 
tion on people’s well-being. We provide an example in appendix C. 
Not only can a better definition of  well-being,  justified as a better 
measurement, be less distorting of  people’s work, marriage, and child- 
bearing choices, but, since it provides larger income maintenance for 
people who are working more, it is also more likely to be politically 
acceptable. Allowing for child-care time gives more to mothers, but since 
they get “credit” for either child-care time or market-work time, some 
neutrality is still preserved with respect to fertility decisions. 
One can think, then, of  searching for a measure of well-being, and a 
taxation and income maintenance policy based on it, that would be as 
undistorting as possible of  work and family decisions. No easy definition 
of  “neutrality”  exists, but perhaps we can recognize and avoid unduly 
large, potentially distorting effects. 
6.8  Summary and Conclusions 
We have examined several ways in which time and its use are impor- 
tant. In the area of  private philanthropy, the value of  time devoted to 
helping institutions or other individuals is at least as great as the money 
given. A whole range of  interesting research projects awaits enthusiasts 
of  selection bias to estimate the value of  that time. 
There is also emergency time and money help, on which  we  have 
relative frequency but no real quantitative measurement. Measurement 
here must deal with the expected value or insurance value of such rights 
to help, as well as the value of  the time component. 218  James N. Morgan 
1. YES  pb  GOTOK71 
Inside the family living together, money flows are unmeasurable, but 
we can look at the contributions of  money and time each individual 
makes, including housework and child-care time. Once we agree on how 
to estimate each member’s benefit from the family, we can estimate net 
benefit (plus or minus), particularly by age and sex. At any reasonable 
assumption about the value of  housework time and the division of  ben- 
efits, the amount of  intrafamily transfers is much larger than the $230 
billion of transfer payments in the national accounts. The implications for 
explosion of  transfer  payments  if  private  responsibility continues  to 
diminish are obvious. 
Finally, the level and distribution of well-being and its rate of improve- 
ment  over  time,  as  well  as policy  about redistribution, also require 
dealing with transfers and with time. We suggest the need for a standard 
definition that takes account of money and nonmoney transfers as both a 
measure of  well-being and a criterion for taxation and income mainte- 
nance programs. An illustrative example suggests that better definitions 
are less likely to have distorting effects on people’s decisions about work, 
having children, and who lives with whom (doubling up). 
Appendix A  Questions Asked  in the 1980  (13th) 
Wave of  the Panel  Study of  Income 
Dynamics on Interfamily Emergency 
Help Patterns 
K66.  Last year did you help support anyone who doesn’t live here with 
you now? 
K67.  How many? 
K68.  How much money did that amount to in the last year? 
$  IN 1979 
K69.  Were any of  these people dependent on you for more 
than half of  their total support? 
1. YES  pk  GO TO K71  9 









People sometimes have emergencies and need help from others- 
either time or money. Let’s start by talking about time. In the last 
five years have you (or anyone living with you) spent a lot of time 
helping either a relative or friend in an emergency? 
1. YES  pb  GO TO K74  9 
Was the person you helped a relative of  (yours/anybody who lives 
here)? 
pq 
What kind of help was that? 
Suppose there were a serious emergency in your household. Is 
there a friend or relative living nearby whom you could call on to 
spend a lot of  time helping out? 
3. DEPENDS  5. NO  8. DON’T KNOW  ’  ’  C!O!OK80  ’ 
Would that be a relative? 
15. NO  GO TO K77 
4 
What is that person’s relationship to you? 
How much would that person mind spending time helping you 
out-a  lot, a little bit, or not at all? 
pGq  -1 
pFEzq  pEiiq 
Would you feel you had to repay that person in some way? 220  James N. Morgan 
K79.  If that person were not available, is there someone else you could 
call on? 
pq  pGEGq 
K80.  Do you have a relative or friend who doesn’t live near you who 
could come to help you in an emergency? 
1. YES  wk  GO  TO K83  7 
‘I’ 
K81.  Is that person a relative? 
1. YES  pb  GO TO K83 
K82.  What is that person’s relationship to you? 
K83.  In the last five years has either a friend or a relative spent a lot of 
time helping you in an emergency? 
1. YES  pk  GOTOK85  7 
K84.  What kind of help did you receive? (Did you receive any other 
kind(s) of help?) 
K85.  We’ve talked about time, now let’s talk about money. Do you 
have any savings such as a checking or savings account, or  govern- 
ment bonds? 
1. YES  pb  GOTOK88  7 
K86.  Would they amount to as much as two months’ income or more? 
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K87.  Would they amount to as much as a year’s income or more? 
I  I 
GO TO K89 
K88.  Was there a time in the last five years when you had as much as two 
months’ income saved up? 
K89.  Suppose in  an emergency you needed several hundred dollars 
more than you had available or could borrow from an institution. 
Would you ask either a friend or a relative for it? 
3. DEPENDS  5. NO  8. DON’T KNOW  7  ‘  ’  C!OLOK95  ’ 
K90.  Is the person you would ask a relative? 
pb  GO TO K92 
K91.  What is that person’s relationship to you? 
K92.  How much would that person mind helping you out with money- 
a lot, a little bit, or not at all? 
pq pxiGZq 
piGEiq  [-I 
K93.  Would this money be a loan or a gift? 
Fl  GOTOK95 
J. 
K94.  Would you expect to pay interest on it? 
11. YES I  15. NO) 222  James N. Morgan 
K95.  In the last five years have you received any amount such as several 
hundred dollars from either a friend or relative? 
K96.  Was it a loan or a gift? 
K97.  Did you pay interest on it? 
15. NO  GO TO K98 
1 5. GIFT b-  GO TO K98 
K98.  In the last five years have you helped out either a friend or a 
relative in an emergency by giving or loaning them several hun- 
dred dollars or more? 
GO TO K103 
K99.  Was the person you helped a relative? 
1. YES  pb  GO TO KlOl  cs? 
K100.  What is that person’s relationship to you? 
K101.  Was that a loan or a gift? 
Eb  GO TO K103 
K102.  Did (hehhe) pay interest on it? 
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K103.  Prices and costs have been rising generally-are  there some par- 
ticular increases that have hit you especially hard? 
K104.  What are they? 
K105.  Have you been able to do anything about it? 
K106.  What have you done? 
I 
Appendix B  Estimation of  Intrafamily Transfers 
Assumptions must be made about the benefit  allocation of  the family 
income to its members and about allocation of some income components 
as to who contributed them. A realistic estimate also requires inclusion of 
the major nonmoney components of income. We start by defining a more 
global concept of  income consisting of: 
Total family money income (before taxes) 
Imputed return (at 5 percent) on net equity in the house-free  rent 
Value of  housing received free for those who neither own nor rent 
Value of  food stamp subsidy 
Government subsidy of  heating costs 
Value of  housework hours (at $6 in 1979) 
The individual benefits from the family income are assumed with every- 
one 14 or older counting as one, those 6-13  counting  3.57, those 3-5 
counting .571, and those under 3 counting .286; the sum of  these equiva- 
lent adult numbers being the base. Thus, an only child aged 4 is assumed 
to benefit from .571/2.714 of  the family income. This implicitly assumes 
that taxes paid out of  income purchase a benefit too. 
As for the contribution attributed to individuals, we can identify the 
earnings of  the wife, and the wages, bonus, professional practice, and 
market gardening labor income of the husband. All taxable income of the 
head and wife beyond that is divided equally between them, it being 
mostly  asset  income  from  assets  that  they  presumably  both helped 
accumulate. Imputed rent is also allocated 50150 between husband and 224  James N. Morgan 
wife. The transfer  income of  head and wife from contributory trans- 
fers-Social  Security, retirement, unemployment, worker’s compensa- 
tion, child support-is  also divided equally between them. Noncontribu- 
tory transfers of head and wife are divided among the whole family in the 
same proportions as their estimated share of the consumption of income. 
That leaves the income of “others,” which appears in each individual’s 
record in two parts: taxable income and transfer income. For the detail in 
the tables, other individuals’ transfer income is considered to be part of 
their income from “contributory transfers or assets” if  it is reported to be 
from  Social Security,  retirement  pay,  unemployment  compensation, 
worker’s compensation, or child support, otherwise to be income from 
noncontributory  transfers.  Notice  that  noncontributory transfers  are 
attributed to the individual, even though such transfers to head or wife 
are allocated as a “contribution” by all family members. Taxable income 
of these other individuals is allocated between labor income and “asset 
income or contributory transfers” according to a code that distinguishes 
those whose taxable income was only labor income, only asset income, or 
both,  with  the “both”  cases being assigned half-labor  and half-asset 
income. 
Our estimates of  the family total income come from worksheets that 
lump the individuals other than the head and wife, but the contributions 
attributed to those other individuals come from individual records that 
contain the two figures for taxable and transfer income of that individual. 
This probably explains why the total net contribution across all family 
members does not come out to be zero, but the orders of magnitude of the 
components are reasonable, and it is the age and gender patterns we are 
concerned with. 
To have complete families, we had to retain nonsample individuals, 
which means that the weighting is not precise. Rather than give nonsam- 
ple individuals zero weights, we  used the family weight for all family 
members. The effect on the overall average net or absolute contribution 
is very small. 225  Time in the Measurement of  Transfers and Well-Being 
Table 6.A.1  Average Gross and Net Contributions to Family, 1979 (for 18,920 
sample and nonsample individuals) 
Total 
Contribution  Total Hours 
of  Housework  Commuting +  Contribution 
$ + Hours  Work +  Net 
House-  at $6  Housework 
work  Housework 
Age  x  $6  Gross  Net  Gross  Net  $  at $6 
Men 
0-2  $  25 
3-5  147 
6-13  809 
14-17  999 
18-24  1444 
25-29  2149 
30-34  2315 
35-44  1989 
45-54  2201 
55-64  2330 
65-74  2956 
75 +  3031 
Women 
0-2  9 
3-5  184 
6-13  1100 
14-17  2351 
18-24  4615 
25-29  7043 
30-34  8026 
35-44  8218 
45-54  7998 
55-64  7570 
65-74  7264 
75 -I-  5458 
All  3635 
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-  1372 
-  2056 
-  3445 
-  5408 
-  6815 
-  3032 
-  2076 
-  880 
395 
-  2572 
-  2374 
-  1681 
-  952 
$ -  1291 
-2118 
-2167 
-  2222 
-  I819 
-  1471 
-  1423 
-  1414 
-  1519 
-  2406 
-  2324 
-  1888 
-  1295 
-  1932 
-  1869 
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Free Time if  Each 
Adult Works Full Time 
\ 2,000 Hours per Year 
( $Family Needs  1 
Well-Being = 
Appendix C A Test Model 
6760 
8760 Work Hours 
per Adult 
-  ($Actual Income).  Subsidy = %(($Needs) 
We now have only to define needs standards and the work hour allowance 
for housework and child care. 
The well-being function is, of  course, analogous to the usual produc- 
tion function-linear,  homogenous. 
One could argue about  the exponents and develop more complex 
measures (Lazear and Michael 1980). And one can deduct sleep time 
from the base and make the measure much more sensitive to work hours 
(too sensitive, I think). But let’s proceed to fix the needs standards and 
work allowances and see the results. 227  Time in the Measurement of  Transfers and Well-Being 
We define needs with no economy of  scale adjustments purposely to 
Needs: 
encourage living together and sharing: 
Each adult 18 or older  $3,000 
Each child 12-17  2,000 
Each child 6-11  1,500 
Each child under 6  1,000 
But we allow for some economies in caring for children: 
Work credit for housework and child care: 
Household management (each dwelling) 1,000  hours plus 500 hours 
for each child under 18, plus another 500 if  any child is under 6. 
Maximum = 3,500 hours. 
One could easily argue with these standards, but it is useful to think of 
them as a point of  departure and see their  implications for people’s 
decisions about working, having children, or doubling up. And we can 
ask whether the results seem equitable, particularly as between families 
with two, one, or no earners. 
A set of illustrative cases is given, skipping over the algebra and giving 
the net subsidy or tax, and the after-tax, after-subsidy disposable income, 
and the well-being measure. One can see the effects of  decisions about 
market work by moving down the columns, of marrying by looking three 
columns to the right, of having children (and usually working less in the 
market) by moving diagonally up to the right. 
To keep things as simple as we can, we assume a fixed $3 per hour for 
market work. 
A single adult with one child ends up with $2,000, all subsidy, without 
doing any market work, $3,840 after earning $3,000 working half-time, or 
$5,838 working full time. The marginal tax rates on money earnings are 
41 percent and 33 percent because of the allowance for work effort and 
the well-being measure goes from .71 to .90 to 1.01, meaning that the 
person is better-off working. Some basic guarantee or separate child-care 
allowance might be necessary-I’ll  come back to that issue. 
A couple with one preschool child ends up with $6,500 if  they do only 
2,000 hours of market work-both  half-time or only one working and the 
other minding the house and child. Increasing market work by  1,000 
hours raises earnings by $3,000, after-tax income by  $1,780 ($6,500 to 
$8,280), implying a marginal tax rate of 41 percent. Another 1,000  hours, 
meaning both parents work full time, would mean $12,000 in earnings, 
$10,095 after taxes. In terms of  our well-being index, a couple with one 
child going from one full-time equivalent market worker to one and 
one-half to two has a well-being measure that goes from .96 to 1.05 and 228  James N. Morgan 
1.11, a reasonable incentive compared with a straight 50 percent tax or 
subsidy of  differences from the need standard of  $7,000, ignoring work 
effort which would produce well-being measures of  .95, 1.01, and 1.05. 
More important than work decisions, which have been overstressed 
anyway, are decisions about who lives with whom and pools resources 
and decisions about having children. More children always means a lower 
level of  economic well-being even after the subsidies-taxes, even if  the 
parent or parents manage to keep working for money. Presumably we 
want it that way. Even though we want to be sure children are properly 
cared for, we don’t want it to be economically profitable to parents to 
have them. 
The case where society would most like to encourage combining fami- 
lies is that of  two single parents. Suppose they each have one preschool 
child. Separately they might each work half-time, end up with $3,840 
disposable income and a well-being ratio of  .90. Together, even without 
working more than before in the market, the pooled family would have 
$7,153 in disposable income and a well-being ratio of  .93. The total 
subsidy would fall from twice $840 or $1,680 to $1,153. And if  there are 
economies in living together not incorporated in the needs standard and 
hence not recaptured by the government, the incentive to double up is 
still greater. For instance, it might easily be possible, because of shared 
responsibility for the children, for the parents to do more market work. 
A more usual situation is a woman with several children and a man with 
no children he is taking any direct responsibility for. A woman with three 
children aged 2,4, and 6, not working in the market, would get a subsidy 
of  $3,802 and be in difficult shape (well-being = .71). A single man 
working full time would end up with $4,755 after taxes, well-being = 
1.16. Marriage would produce a family with  a disposable income of 
$8,130, $2,130 of  it subsidy, and well-being of  .89. The government has 
reduced the cost to the man of acquiring a family. Separately the govern- 
ment collected $1,245 in taxes from the man, gave $3,802 to the mother, 
net cost $2,557. Together, the government provides a subsidy of $2,130, 
recapturing  almost  none  of  the gains from  doubling up.  Additional 
child-support subsidies would help. 
In general, as you can see from the tables, marrying is not discouraged, 
having additional children is discouraged, and you are always better-off, 
in terms of  a sensible measure of  well-being, if  you work more. Most 
important of all, there is credit given for work, and the working poor are 
treated a little better. This may be all it takes to improve public accept- 
ance of adequate income maintenance programs. Put another way, the 
marginal tax rate on income from work is lower than  that on other 
income, and the needs standard on which subsidies or taxes are based is 
set higher the more work people do. 229  Time in the Measurement of  Transfers and Well-Being 
These figures and this set of  definitions and subsidies and taxes are 
merely illustrative. The important issue is how to design a system that 
does not distort in antisocial directions decisions about having children, 
sharing households and child raising, or working. And the crucial point is 
that if the standard of well-being the program uses as a goal takes account 
of  worWleisure as well as money income and family needs, it is more 
likely to be balanced in these three dimensions. The result should be a 
greater sense of equity between the working and nonworking (for money) 
poor, and between parents who devote more or less time to children, and 
between men and women. 
As we have said, there is also a concern for the proper care of children, 
and there is the problem that income maintenance floors sufficient to 
assure that care might put a money premium on having children, while 
inadequate support might punish children for the indiscretion of  their 
parents. I have suggested elsewhere the possibility of separate child-care 
subsidies, paid for by long-term surtaxes on all parents for each child they 
produced. Instead of trying to squeeze the full current cost out of parents, 
including divorced ones, we proposed a surtax for forty years on each 
parent for each child. For normal families, this amounts to an installment 
plan method of paying for child-raising  costs. But it puts “women’s  work” 
in the market place, gives her free choice whether to work in the market 
or raise children, allows the setting of  national standards for child care 
separately from the taxes, which imply a population policy or national 
fertility policy. Child care is expensive in both time and money, and it 
would take something like a 5 percent surtax per child to make the system 
generally self-financed. Remember that the subsidies come during the 
first eighteen years, the payments spread over forty, and even at 3 percent 
(real rate) the present value of  forty annual surtax payments is only 23 
times the annual payment while the eighteen-year cost has a present 
value of  over 14 times the annual cost. 
Such schemes are easy to invent, but their popular understanding and 
acceptance, and their actual effects on behavior, require some advanced 
research, and I mean more than speculating about the possible effects. A 
variety of research eliciting responses from representative samples of the 
population should be done. Are the needs standards and the housework- 
child-care allowances realistic and fair between different family sizes so 
they will not distort people’s choices about living arrangements? 
Our present  Panel  Study data could be  used  to be  used  to make 
estimates of the impact of any proposed scheme, though only before any 
effects it might have on behavior. Such impact studies are most useful if a 
scheme is not expected to alter behavior very much. But a change to a 
system that was more nearly neutral with respect to individual choices 
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Table 6.A.2  Amount of Subsidy (or Tax), Disposable Income, and Well-Being 
Index for Families of Different Composition, Work, and Earned 
Income under a Program to Maintain Well-Being (not just income) 
One Adult 
No  One Child  Children 
Children  Under 6  2,4,&6 
Dollar income needs  $3,000  $4,000  $6,500 
Hours credit for 
housework & child care  1  ,000  2,000  3,000 
Market Work 






1,305  2,000  3,802 
0  840  3,112 
-  1,245  -  162  2,850 
-3,303*  -  1,102*  6,433* 
-  2,370  -  904*  3,459* 
Net Disposable Income 
None 




1,305  2,000  3,802 
3  ,000  3,840  6,112 
4,755  5,838  8,850 
6,630  8,096  12,459* 
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Two Adults 
One  Two  Children 
No  Child  Children  2,4, 
Children  Under 6  Under 6  &6 
Dollar Income Needs  $6,000  $7,000  $8,000  $9,500 
housework & child care  1 ,m  2,000  2,500  3,500 
Hours credit for 
Market Work 
















2,454  3,048  3,636  4,418 
1,113  1,755  1,846  3,250 
-  210  500  1,153  2,130 
-  1,500  -  720  0  1,058* 
-2,760  -  1,905  -  1,092*  -  104* 
Net Disposable Income 
2,454  3,048  3,636  4,418 
4,113  4,755  4,846  6,250 
5,790  6,500  7,153  8,130 
7,500  8,280  9,000  10,095 
9,240  10,095  10,908*  11,896* 
Well-Being Measure 
.71  .70  .71  .71 
.88  .85  .79  .81 
1.02  .96  .93  .89 
1.12  1.05  1  .OO  .95* 
1.19  1.11*  1.05*  .99* 
*Would probably require paying for housework and child care, so net income after that, and 
well-being, would be smaller. 232  James N.  Morgan 
Notes 
1.  We did not attempt to deal with the two possible selection biases which would occur if 
people who work for money earn more than those who do  not work for money would have 
earned, and if  people who do volunteer work would be more productive at the work than 
those who do not volunteer. 
2.  See the chapter giving details in Five  Thousand American Families, vol.  10, Ann 
Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research (forthcoming). See appendix A for the actual 
questions asked. 
3.  Measures of  family well-being do have to deal with economies of scale in estimating 
family needs and relating income to needs, and the official poverty standards incorporate 
such estimates. 
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Comment  Daniel S. Hamermesh 
In this study Professor Morgan has epitomized what the Survey Research 
Center has become most noted for: the production of  interesting numbers 
Daniel S. Hamermesh is a professor of  economics at Michigan State University, East 
Lansing, Michigan, and a research associate of the National Bureau of  Economic Research. 235  Time in the Measurement of  Transfers and Well-Being 
based on survey results. This particular set of numbers on the magnitudes 
and directions of inter- and intrafamily transfers is important to anyone 
interested in problems of labor supply, taxation, discrimination, or the 
measurement of well-being. The figures will provide substantial grist for 
the mills of economists seeking to test theories of household behavior. 
The paper stresses intrafamily transfers especially. It claims, based on 
the valuation of their size, that the death of private support for dependent 
family members has been announced a bit prematurely, that reliance on 
publicly provided income maintenance is much less extensive than we 
thought. This claim rests on the valuation of  time spent in household 
production, which Morgan rates at $6 per hour, If  this is too high, as I 
believe it is, we should not abandon our preconceptions about the rela- 
tive importance of  public and private transfers as rapidly as this paper 
would have us do. 
One way to get an upper bound on the value of  time spent in home 
production is to ask: What would it cost to purchase the services in the 
market? The  average woman age 30-34 (see table 6.A.1) does 1338  hours 
of  housework. This is  undoubtedly  an underestimate of  the amount 
performed by a nonworking mother with two small children, since Mor- 
gan’s average includes unmarried women and married women with no 
small children. Therefore, assume 2000 hours is a fair guess of the hours 
spent in household production by  a full-time housewife with children. 
Based on Gauger and Walker (1980), I estimate that in 1979 dollars the 
cost of purchasing the services provided by a housewife with one child 
under age 5 and the other under age 12 is $11,000. We thus find that 
$5.50/hour is all the market values her services. 
.  The $5.50 is clearly an upper bound, even for prime-age women. It 
ignores the fact that higher wages must be paid in the market to induce 
people to leave the home, to compensate for commuting costs and work 
in an unpleasant environment, and so forth. Also, because one can mix 
leisure and work much more readily at home than in the market, the 
supply price of  an hour of  household production is likely to be far less 
than the cost of purchasing the same hour in the market. Third, even if an 
hour purchased in the market did cost $6, an hour of the nonspecialist’s 
time at home is not worth $6: I am quite sure no one would buy my 
services as a plumber, glazier, or carpenter for $6. This last consideration 
means that the value of housework performed by men in the sample (who 
do not specialize in housework) is especially overstated. Finally, the $6 
per hour figure is far too high even as a price of  time in the market for 
many persons in the sample: I doubt the average 4-year-old girl could 
have commanded $6/hour for the thirty hours of housework Morgan lists 
for her, and similarly for the roughly five hundred hours per annum 
performed by men 65 + and the thousand hours performed by  women 
65 + . One should note that these points have little to do with the selection 236  James N. Morgan 
biases that Morgan refers to; those are statistical problems, these are 
economic ones. 
What is an appropriate figure if $6 is not? I am not sure, but I would bet 
it is much closer to the one-third of  the market wage that has been 
estimated as the value of  time spent commuting than it is to the full 
market wage. That being so, and noting that $6 was around the average 
wage rate in 1979, valuing the average person’s housework at $2/hour 
seems reasonable. In that case the aggregate value of housework is $273 
billion rather than the $818 billion implied by the average of 606 hours of 
housework per annum per person in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
sample. This recalculation alone reduces the total amount of intrafamily 
transfers by $171 billion, from $695 billion to $524 billion. 
Intrafamily transfers seem even smaller compared to interfamily and 
socially provided transfers when the latter are adjusted for underreport- 
ing. Morgan’s aggregates of  $5.0, $2.6, and $71.5 billion for unemploy- 
ment insurance, workers’ compensation, and Social Security compare to 
official total benefits received in  1979 of  $8.6, $8.4, and $90.6 for these 
programs. Here too, another bias is introduced that leads to an overstate- 
ment of the case for the importance of  intrafamily transfers. 
The only calculation that might cause a downward bias in the size of 
intrafamily transfers is the attribution of  contributory transfer income 
evenly to husbands and wives. Since the primary beneficiaries of  Social 
Security, as well as unemployment insurance and workers’ compensa- 
tion, are disproportionately males, this clearly overstates (understates) 
the income  received  by  females  (males).  Insofar  as the calculations 
already show a slightly greater net lifetime transfer from males to females 
than vice versa, they are biased down. The bias, though, is likely to be 
tiny given the small size of contributory transfers relative to other sources 
of  income. 
Morgan constructs seemingly arbitrary equivalence scales among fam- 
ily members, counting persons aged 14 + as one, 6-13  as .86,3-5 as .57, 
and those below age 3 as .29. This equivalence is used to reflect “needs” 
and thus allocate the family income among family members. I am not sure 
what “needs” means, indeed; as an economist I find the term somewhat 
repugnant. Certainly if one values a housewife’s time at the market wage, 
the amount of  the family’s full income transferred to a newborn child 
must exceed the amount implied by a “need” equaling .29 of an adult’s. 
More important, do men and women consume equal amounts of  the 
household’s full income, or, as many feminists claim, do men receive a 
disproportionate  share based  on  claims stemming from their market 
work? If so, net transfers by men aged 25 + are overstated while those of 
women are understated. 
The last section of  the paper is quite separate from the rest; it repre- 
sents an attempt to  point out the importance of distinguishing  leisure time 237  Time in the Measurement of  Transfers and Well-Being 
from  time  spent in  household  and market  production  in  comparing 
well-being across families. Though I am not bothered by comparisons of 
income across families, nor by  attempts to compare full incomes by 
valuing carefully time spent in home production, an interfamily compari- 
son of utility, even though it is called “well-being” and is specified ex ante 
as a Cobb-Douglas function with coefficient a  = .5, is hard to swallow. It 
should suffice  to note that leisure is important in measuring GNP, though 
Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) and others have already noted this. 
Morgan  has greatly overstated the size of  intrafamily transfers by 
overvaluing time in home production and underestimating the correla- 
tion of gross contributions and “needs,” and he has overestimated inter- 
family transfers by overvaluing time. Nonetheless, the raw data he pre- 
sents are provocative; they pose some interesting mysteries and should 
lead to some fruitful extensions. Two of these caught my attention, and 
there are undoubtedly others. First, in table 6.2 there is a consistent 
inverse-U shaped relation between age and gifts of money and time, and 
the receipt of gifts of time bears a U-shaped relation to age. However, the 
incidence of  receipt of  monetary gifts is monotonically decreasing with 
age. This may result from differential underreporting of gifts by age, but 
why should the differential exist for time but not for money? Conversely, 
it may reflect the observation that people 65 and over decumulate wealth 
very slowly, if  at all, and reduce their spending on goods as they age 
(Hamermesh 1984); that being so, emergency gifts of  money are not 
needed, though emergency gifts of time may be required to complement 
goods as inputs in household production, especially among the oldest 
people. This is consistent with the sharp jump in the reported incidence of 
receipt of  gifts of  time in the 75 + age category. 
Morgan’s data can  and should be  used  to examine  differences in 
intrafamily transfers by husbands and wives across education groups and 
by race. Do these correlations correspond to what theories of  marital 
sorting would predict? How do households compensate for the presence 
of discrimination in the market by reallocating effort in household pro- 
duction? Finally, on a corrected version of the data underlying figure 6.4, 
are the actuarial present values of net transfers by men and women equal, 
and, if not, how do these reflect adjustments to market discrimination? 
Clearly, Morgan’s major contribution here is the provision of  data that 
can  enable social scientists to answer questions  about the nature of 
exchange within households and its response to market forces. 
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